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Ocularcentrism and Deepfakes:
Should Seeing Be Believing?
Katrina Geddes*
The pernicious effects of misinformation were starkly exposed
on January 6, 2021, when a violent mob of protestors stormed the
nation’s capital, fueled by false claims of election fraud. As policymakers wrestle with various proposals to curb misinformation
online, this Article highlights one of the root causes of our vulnerability to misinformation, specifically, the epistemological prioritization of sight above all other senses (“ocularcentrism”). The increasing ubiquity of so-called “deepfakes”—hyperrealistic, digitally altered videos of events that never occurred—has further exposed the
vulnerabilities of an ocularcentric society, in which technology-mediated sight is synonymous with knowledge. This Article traces the
evolution of visual manipulation technologies that have exploited
ocularcentrism and evaluates different means of addressing the issues raised by deepfakes, including the use of copyright law.
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INTRODUCTION

Since its unholy beginnings in pornography, deepfake technology has, understandably, been the subject of widespread criticism
and outrage. Broadly speaking, a “deepfake” is a hyperrealistic
video that has been digitally altered to depict an event or events that
never occurred.1 At the individual level, pornographic and other
harmful kinds of deepfakes can cause significant psychological and
reputational harm.2 At the collective level, the dissemination of
deepfakes affects our ability to differentiate authentic from inauthentic content, rendering us more vulnerable to misinformation.3
This effect, however, is not limited to deepfakes; photographs and
videos have long been vulnerable to manipulation. The problem,
then, is not deepfakes per se, but our uncritical and disproportionate
reliance on technology-mediated sight, and our insistence that seeing is believing. The initial purpose of this Article is to understand
the historical persistence of “ocularcentrism,” or the epistemological prioritization of sight above other human senses,4 and, secondly,
to situate deepfakes within this social history—do deepfakes represent the limit of our tolerance for visual manipulation, and if so,
why? Do they truly threaten visual truth in a way that earlier

1

Mika Westerlund, The Emergence of Deepfake Technology: A Review, 9 TECH.
INNOVATION MGMT. 39, 40 (2019).
2
See, e.g., Anne Pechenik Gieseke, “The New Weapon of Choice”: Law’s Current
Inability to Properly Address Deepfake Pornography, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1479, 1479
(2020).
3
See, e.g., Nina I. Brown, Deepfakes and the Weaponization of Disinformation, 23 VA.
J. L. TECH. 1, 2 (2020); Robert Chesney & Danielle Keats Citron, 21st Century-Style Truth
Decay: Deep Fakes and the Challenge for Privacy, Free Expression, and National
Security, 78 MD. L. REV. 882, 883–84 (2019); Holly Kathleen Hall, Deepfake Videos:
When Seeing Isn’t Believing, 27 CATH. U. J. L. & TECH. 51, 52 (2018).
4
See, e.g., Jenni Lauwrens, Can You See What I Mean? An Exploration of the Limits
of Vision in Anti-Ocularcentric Contemporary Art, 47 DE ARTE 26, 28 (2012); Martin Jay,
Scopic Regimes of Modernity, in VISION AND VISUALITY 3, 3 (Hal Foster ed., 1988),
MARTIN JAY, DOWNCAST EYES: THE DENIGRATION OF VISION IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
FRENCH THOUGHT 3 (1993).
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technologies have not? If so, should we abandon ocularcentrism—
or cling to the credibility of visual evidence?
To date, existing scholarship on deepfakes has failed to differentiate between, and tailor solutions for, the individual and collective harms associated with their dissemination. Such tailoring is
needed to preserve the substantial utility that deepfakes offer. Deepfake audio recreated the speech that John F. Kennedy intended to
deliver shortly before his assassination, using recordings of 831
speeches he delivered in his lifetime, and offering hope to patients
who have lost their voices to illness.5 Researchers have used deepfake technology to create animated, photorealistic avatars of deceased persons and portrait subjects.6 Museum visitors can interact
with life-size deepfakes of long-dead artists, constructed from archival footage.7 Deepfake technology can be used to anonymize vulnerable sources,8 generate multilingual voice petitions,9 produce
synthetic MRI images that protect patient privacy,10 synthesize news

5

JFK
Unsilenced,
CEREPROC,
https://www.cereproc.com/en/jfkunsilenced
[https://perma.cc/K7BB-3B4U].
6
Egor Zakharov et al., Few-Shot Adversarial Learning of Realistic Neural Talking
Head Models, Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2019 IEEE/CVF INT’L
CONFERENCE ON COMP. VISION 9459, 9459 (2019); Westerlund, supra note 1, at 41–43.
7
Dami Lee, Deepfake Salvador Dalí Takes Selfies with Museum Visitors, THE VERGE
(May 10, 2019, 8:50 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/10/18540953/salvador-dalilives-deepfake-museum [https://perma.cc/9M8P-T975].
8
Rebecca Heilweil, “How Deepfakes Could Actually Do Some Good,” VOX (June 29,
2020, 11:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/6/29/21303588/deepfakesanonymous-artificial-intelligence-welcome-to-chechnya
[https://perma.cc/4THG-UL
MQ].
9
Guy Davies, David Beckham ‘Speaks’ 9 Languages for New Campaign to End
Malaria, ABC NEWS (Apr. 9, 2019, 12:51 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/International/
david-beckham-speaks-languages-campaign-end-malaria/story?id=62270227 [https://per
ma.cc/XQ7Q-C3DQ]; see also Kim Lyons, An Indian Politician Used AI to Translate His
Speech into Other Languages to Reach More Voters, THE VERGE (Feb. 18, 2020, 5:35 PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/2/18/21142782/india-politician-deepfakes-ai-elections
[https://perma.cc/Y8DM-N7PZ].
10
Hoo-Chang Shin et al., Medical Image Synthesis for Data Augmentation and
Anonymization Using Generative Adversarial Networks 1 (Sept. 13, 2018) (unpublished
manuscript) (available at https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.10225.
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reports,11 improve video-game graphics,12 reverse the aging process,13 re-animate old photos,14 and elevate fanfiction.15 If, like most
forms of technology, deepfakes are capable of both beneficial and
harmful use, how should the technology be regulated to maximize
its utility and minimize its harm?

11
Simon Chandler, Reuters Uses AI to Prototype First Ever Automated Video Reports,
FORBES (Feb. 7, 2020, 8:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/simonchandler/
2020/02/07/reuters-uses-ai-to-prototype-first-ever-automated-video-reports/?sh=35d9aa8
7a2a7 [https://perma.cc/PG2G-KX2S].
12
James Vincent, Nvidia Has Created the First Video Game Demo Using AI-Generated
Graphics, THE VERGE (Dec. 3, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/
2018/12/3/18121198/ai-generated-video-game-graphics-nvidia-driving-demo-neurips
[https://perma.cc/F864-AHVN].
13
Jacob Kastrenakes, When Diplo and The Strokes Need a Deepfake, They Go to This
Guy, THE VERGE (Mar. 4, 2020, 12:30 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/
3/4/21164607/the-fakening-deepfakes-strokes-diplo-memes-music-industry-elon-muskjeff-bezos-star-trek [https://perma.cc/ZJ9Q-YLGX]. See also The Strokes, The Strokes –
Bad Decisions (Official Video), YOUTUBE (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=5fbZTnZDvPA&t=9s [https://perma.cc/9BVU-B8FY].
14
Alex Hern, Deep Nostalgia: 'Creepy' New Service Uses AI to Animate Old Family
Photos, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 1, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/mar/01/deep-nostalgia-creepy-new-service-ai-animate-old-family-photos
[https://perma.cc/BG5L-5UG3]
15
See, e.g., Jay Peters, This Disturbingly Realistic Deepfake Puts Jeff Bezos and Elon
Musk in a Star Trek Episode, THE VERGE (Feb. 20, 2020, 3:35 PM),
https://www.theverge.com/tldr/2020/2/20/21145826/deepfake-jeff-bezos-elon-muskalien-star-trek-the-cage-amazon-tesla [https://perma.cc/6ZXE-NG43]; Chaim Gartenberg,
Deepfake Edits Have Put Harrison Ford into Solo: A Star Wars Story, for Better or for
Worse, THE VERGE (Oct. 17, 2018, 3:37 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/
10/17/17990162/deepfake-edits-harrison-ford-han-solo-a-star-wars-story-alden-ehren
reich [https://perma.cc/3WK6-8W6B]; KC Ifeanyi, According to this Deepfake, Neo
Taking the Blue Pill in ‘The Matrix’ Would’ve Been ‘Office Space’, FAST COMPANY (Feb.
19, 2020), https://www.fastcompany.com/90465563/according-to-this-deep-fake-neotaking-the-blue-pill-in-the-matrix-wouldve-been-office-space [https://perma.cc/2VEN2GVY]; Lee Moran, Jon Snow Says Sorry for ‘Game of Thrones’ Finale in Convincing
Deepfake, HUFFINGTON POST (June 14, 2019, 9:18 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/
entry/game-of-thrones-deepfake-jon-snow_n_5d038623e4b0985c419bded2 [https://per
ma.cc/4F59-XKHQ]; Zack Sharf, The Shining Deepfake Goes Viral with Jim Carrey
Starring as Jack Torrance, INDIEWIRE (July 10, 2019, 12:14 PM),
https://www.indiewire.com/2019/07/the-shining-jim-carrey-deepfake-video-viral1202156857/ [https://perma.cc/JT8B-XZND]; Sven Charleer, Family Fun with Deepfakes.
Or How I Got My Wife onto The Tonight Show, MEDIUM (Feb. 2, 2018),
https://towardsdatascience.com/family-fun-with-deepfakes-or-how-i-got-my-wife-ontothe-tonight-show-a4454775c011 [https://perma.cc/X9YP-VGJL].
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This Article will explore this question through the lens of copyright law and policy. The creation of deepfakes depends heavily on
access to, and manipulation of, audiovisual content—much of which
is protected by copyright law. Accordingly, copyright represents a
natural lens through which to evaluate the unique social issues raised
by the creation and dissemination of deepfakes. Part I will explain
the technical process by which deepfakes are created and evaluate
whether a deepfake video would constitute transformative fair use.16
Part II will discuss both the individual and collective harms generated by the dissemination of deepfakes, including the erosion of
our ability to differentiate authentic from inauthentic content. It will
interrogate the historical basis for the normative claim that seeing
is believing and problematize the role of ocularcentrism in promoting both surveillance and misinformation. Part III will evaluate a
variety of legal and regulatory measures that have been proposed
to address the harms caused by deepfakes. The Conclusion will
summarize the discussion contained within the Article and provide
final thoughts.
I.

ARE DEEPFAKES PROTECTED BY FAIR USE?

For now, this question remains theoretical; no judicial proceeding has yet determined whether fair use protects the creators of deepfakes from copyright infringement liability. So, the question becomes conditional: should deepfakes be protected by fair use?
Would such protection be consistent with the evolution of fair use
jurisprudence and the overarching policy objectives of the copyright
regime? These are the questions that will be explored in this section.
A. Background
First, it is important to understand the technical process by
which deepfakes are created. The term deepfake—a combination of
“deep learning” and “fake”—generally refers to synthetic content

16

The copyrightability of deepfakes as transformative fair uses would be consistent both
with the long jurisprudential history of fair use, as well as copyright law’s ostensible
content neutrality (i.e., the availability of copyright protection should not depend on
whether the work is a photograph of candy or an Impressionist painting).
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created by an artificial neural network,17 but the term has colloquially been used to describe a broad spectrum of hyperrealistic content.18 At the sophisticated end of the spectrum, a recurrent neural
network (“RNN”) can generate synthetic video footage of an individual from an audio recording.19 The process of mapping from a
one-dimensional (audio) signal to a three-dimensional time-varying
image is technically challenging, but bears substantial utility.20 For
example, an individual who is hearing-impaired could lip-read a
synthetic video generated from over-the-phone audio.21 Researchers
from the University of Washington trained a RNN on seventeen
hours of video footage of President Obama delivering 300 weekly
addresses.22 From this corpus of video footage, they extracted 1.9
million video frames.23 For every output video frame, the RNN detects mouth landmarks (18 points along the outer and inner contours
of the lip) to generate a sparse mouth shape.24 The mouth shape and
lower region of the face are given texture before the synthesized
mouth region is blended into the target video.25 The target video is
then re-timed to ensure that the natural head motion matches the input audio.26 Essentially, the RNN maps mouth shapes from raw audio to create synthetic footage that can be composited into the mouth
region of a target video for photorealistic results.27
Another sophisticated technique for generating deepfakes is a
generative adversarial network (“GAN”), which pairs a discriminative algorithm (which predicts a label, given certain features) and a

17

Yisroel Mirsky & Wenke Lee, The Creation and Detection of Deepfakes: A Survey,
ACM COMPUTING SURVS., Jan. 2020, at 1.
18
BRITT PARIS & JOAN DONOVAN, DEEPFAKES AND CHEAPFAKES: THE MANIPULATION OF
AUDIO AND VISUAL EVIDENCE 10–11 (2019).
19
Supasorn Suwajanakorn et al., Synthesizing Obama: Learning Lip Sync from Audio,
ACM TRANSACTIONS ON GRAPHICS, July 2017, at 2.
20
Id. at 1.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 8.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 4.
25
Id. at 3.
26
Id.
27
The photorealism generated by the audio-to-shape (mouth shape) neural network can
be observed by using a pixel difference map to compare the groundtruth video of the input
audio and the input audio composited into the target video.
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generative algorithm (which predicts features, given a certain label).28 For example, a discriminative algorithm would try to predict
whether a particular email should be classified as “spam” given its
contents, whereas a generative algorithm would try to predict the
features of an email that had already been classified as spam.
Deepfakes are created by the interaction of these algorithms: the
“generator” generates artificial images that resemble the images in
the training set, and the “discriminator” evaluates these images for
authenticity—whether they came from the training set or not.29
As these algorithms interact, the generator learns to create sufficiently realistic images to fool the discriminator.30
A similar deep learning technique, known as Video Dialogue
Replacement (“VDR”), was used to create a deepfake of Mark
Zuckerberg discussing the profitability of personal data.31 Artists
Barnaby Francis and Daniel Howe created the deepfake using the
proprietary algorithm of an Israeli technology start-up known as
Canny AI.32 Canny engineers trained their deep learning algorithm
on a twenty-one second clip from the target video as well as video
footage of the voice actor speaking, then reconstructed the frames in
the target video to match the facial movements of the voice actor.33
No audio recordings of Zuckerberg were used.34
At the other end of the deepfake spectrum, less sophisticated
actors can create “cheap fakes,” or lower-quality deepfakes, using

28

Russell Spivak, Deepfakes: The Newest Way to Commit One of the Oldest Crimes, 3
GEO. L. TECH. REV. 339, 342–43 (2019).
29
Id. at 343.
30
HAI X. PHAM ET AL., GENERATIVE ADVERSARIAL TALKING HEAD: BRINGING
PORTRAITS TO LIFE WITH A WEAKLY SUPERVISED NEURAL NETWORK 4 (2018).
31
Bill Posters, ‘Imagine This…’, VIMEO (June 12, 2019, 9:30 AM),
https://vimeo.com/341794473 [https://perma.cc/6SGD-UWKC].
32 Samantha Cole, This Deepfake of Mark Zuckerberg Tests Facebook’s Fake Video Policies, VICE (June 11, 2019, 2:25 PM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/ywyxex/deepfakeof-mark-zuckerberg-facebook-fake-video-policy [https://perma.cc/8MKA-7TD9].
33
Id.
34
A comparison of the deepfake with the original (altered) video is available here:
Multimedia LIVE, Artists Create Zuckerberg ‘Deepfake’ Video, YOUTUBE (June 13,
2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cnUd0TpuoXI
[https://perma.cc/283M93DM].
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consumer-grade software or simple video-editing techniques.35
For example, Adobe After Effects and FakeApp were used to create
a deepfake of President Obama delivering impersonated audio by
Jordan Peele.36 And recent cheap fakes that attracted significant attention were created using simple video editing techniques. A video
of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi was slowed down to create the impression of slurred speech,37 and a video of CNN correspondent Jim
Acosta interacting with a White House intern was sped up to suggest
physical assault.38 In each of these cases, the cheap fake was widely
circulated on social media platforms before its falsity was recognized.39 The purpose of this technical summary is simply to highlight the breadth of digitally manipulated media that falls under the
umbrella term “deepfake.” For the purposes of evaluating the copyright issues raised by deepfakes, however, this Article will focus on
two videos created using sophisticated deep learning techniques.
B. Kim Kardashian Deepfake
In 2019, the same artists who created the Mark Zuckerberg deepfake, Barnaby Francis and Daniel Howe, posted on YouTube a deepfake of Kim Kardashian describing the profitability of data

35

PARIS & DONOVAN, supra note 18, at 2; see, e.g., Nic and Pancho, Why Chihuahuas
Don’t Run on the Snow?, YOUTUBE (Jan. 7, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch
?v=JDaLg7G8rH0 [https://perma.cc/8S3W-559D]; Nic and Pancho, Is Pancho Alive? Why
Chihuahuas Don’t Run in the Snow – The Making of, YOUTUBE (Jan. 19, 2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nrWO2CHgBCU [https://perma.cc/KQZ2-PVh5-].
36
James Vincent, Watch Jordan Peele Use AI to Make Barack Obama Deliver a PSA
About Fake News, THE VERGE (Apr. 17, 2018, 1:14 PM), https://www.theverge.com/
tldr/2018/4/17/17247334/ai-fake-news-video-barack-obama-jordan-peele-buzzfeed
[https://perma.cc/89F4-7HGJ].
37
Sarah Mervosh, Distorted Videos of Nancy Pelosi Spread on Facebook and Twitter,
Helped by Trump, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
05/24/us/politics/pelosi-doctored-video.html [https://perma.cc/M2X3-CNJ7].
38
Bijan Stephen, The White House Used a Doctored Video to Tell a Lie, THE VERGE
(Nov. 8, 2018, 6:49 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/11/8/18076532/fake-doctoredvideo-cnn-cspan-infowars-sarah-huckabee-sanders-jim-acosta
[https://perma.cc/U6989EXY].
39
Drew Harwell, Faked Pelosi Videos, Slowed to Make Her Appear Drunk, Spread
Across Social Media, THE WASH. POST (May 24, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/05/23/faked-pelosi-videos-slowed-make-her-appear-drunkspread-across-social-media/ [https://perma.cc/Z3MY-W9AW].
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extraction.40 Condé Nast, the copyright owner of the original video
that had been modified to generate the deepfake,41 indicated that
they wished to block it and YouTube removed it from all territories.42 To date, the deepfake has not been reinstated on YouTube,
although it is still available on Instagram43 and Vimeo.44 It also appears in an exhibition at the Annka Kultys Gallery in London, titled
“Dissimulation,” alongside deepfakes of other public figures including Morgan Freeman and Donald Trump.45
If Francis and Howe had challenged YouTube’s takedown of
their Kardashian deepfake, and Condé Nast had sued for copyright
infringement, Condé Nast would have needed to show not only that
Francis and Howe had copied from its work, but that the copying
rose to the level of improper appropriation.46 This is not a simple
case of comprehensive copying: the original audio has been replaced
with synthetic audio, and although much of the original video footage has been reproduced, Kim’s facial expressions (particularly
in the mouth region) would have been altered to match the new
audio input. It is more likely a case of fragmented literal similarity,
40

Samantha Cole, The Kim Kardashian Deepfake Shows Copyright Claims Are Not the
Answer, VICE (June 19, 2019), https://www.vice.com/en/article/j5wngd/kim-kardashiandeepfake-mark-zuckerberg-facebook-youtube [https://perma.cc/L2BV-BEM7].
41
The original video (“73 Q’s with Kim Kardashian West”) can be viewed here:
Keeping Up with the Wests: Kim, Kanye (and Their Kids!) Answer 73 Questions, VOGUE
(Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.vogue.com/article/73-questions-with-kim-kardashian-west
[https://perma.cc/M9PA-RTAC].
42
Cole, supra note 40. It is still unclear whether Content ID automatically flagged the
deepfake, and Condé Nast’s default response to Content ID claims is to block them, or
whether Condé Nast itself filed a DMCA takedown notice.
43
See Bill Posters (@bill_posters_uk), INSTAGRAM (June 1, 2019), https://www.insta
gram.com/p/ByKg-uKlP4C/ [https://perma.cc/7FX5-NPVU].
44
See Bill Posters, VIMEO (July 1, 2012), https://vimeo.com/user12695491 [https://per
ma.cc/Q84H-PXZM].
45
See ‘Dissimulation,’ Solo Show @ Annka Kultys Gallery, Opening Today, BILL
POSTERS (Oct. 7, 2020), http://billposters.ch/dissimulation-solo-show-annka-kultysgallery-opening-today/ [https://perma.cc/6J5R-B9AX].
46
Laureyssens v. Idea Grp., Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 1992) (“A plaintiff must
first show that his or her work was actually copied. Copying may be established either by
direct evidence of copying or by indirect evidence, including access to the copyrighted
work, similarities that are probative of copying between the works, and expert testimony.
If actual copying is established, a plaintiff must then show that the copying amounts to an
improper appropriation by demonstrating that substantial similarity to protected material
exists between the two works.”).
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where only parts of the original have been reproduced. In this case,
Condé Nast would need to show that the part(s) taken include
copyrightable expression, and are qualitatively and quantitatively
substantial.47 The original video footage contains expressive elements that may meet the requirements of independent creation and
originality48—for example, the camera angles, lighting, choreography, costume design, pacing, and the single continuous take.49
However, the defendants could argue that these compositional

47

Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 797–98 (6th Cir. 2005)
(recognizing the “fragmented literal similarity” standard but declining to apply it in cases
of digital sampling).
48
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (“Original, as the
term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the author
(as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree
of creativity.”).
49
See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884):
“A photograph is the mere mechanical reproduction of the physical
features or outlines of some object, animate or inanimate, and involves
no originality of thought or any novelty in the intellectual operation
connected with its visible reproduction in shape of a picture….[T]he
process is merely mechanical, with no place for novelty, invention, or
originality. It is simply the manual operation, by the use of these
instruments and preparations, of transferring to the plate the visible
representation of some existing object, the accuracy of this
representation being its highest merit…[I]n regard to the photograph
in question…‘[P]laintiff made the same[] entirely from his own
original mental conception, to which he gave visible form by posing
the said Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting and arranging
the costume, draperies, and other various accessories in said
photograph, arranging the subject so as to present graceful outlines,
arranging and disposing the light and shade, suggesting and evoking
the desired expression, and from such disposition, arrangement, or
representation, made entirely by plaintiff, he produced the picture in
suit.’ These findings, we think, show this photograph to be an original
work of art, the product of plaintiff’s intellectual invention.”;
Gentieu v. Tony Stone Images/Chicago, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 838 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (“[F]or
photographs a copyright does not extend to the subject matter of the image itself, but
instead protects the expression of the subject as contained in such elements of the author’s
composition as the selection of lighting, shading, camera angle, background and
perspective.”).
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elements are standard video-interview conventions—scènes à
faire—and thus not copyrightable.50
If Condé Nast can prove that these features of the video are sufficiently original to be copyrightable, the next question is whether
the footage taken was qualitatively and quantitatively substantial.
At this point, we need to differentiate between the footage that was
directly reproduced in the deepfake, and the footage that was used
to train the algorithm to synthesize Kim’s voice and facial movements. With respect to the former, the deepfake appropriates
roughly twenty-two seconds of the eleven-minute Vogue interview
with substituted, synthetic audio and synthetic mouth footage to
match the new audio input. Quantitatively, this segment seems insubstantial: it represents roughly three percent of the original video.
Qualitatively, this segment is not more important than other parts of
the original video: Kim is answering the same kinds of trivial questions that appear in the rest of the video. A court may not find that
this rises to the level of improper appropriation.
The second aspect that must be considered here is the footage
that was used to train the deep learning algorithm. Without access
to the corpus of training footage that was used, we can only infer
that some, or all, of the Vogue interview was used to generate synthetic audio of Kim speaking and synthetic mouth footage to match.
Reproduction of this footage within a training dataset is unlikely to
be sufficiently transitory to fall outside the scope of copyright law.51
However, training the algorithm on factual elements of the copyrighted footage—e.g., the physical features of Kim’s face—does not
50
See, e.g., Bill Diodata Photography, LLC v. Kate Spade, LLC, 388 F. Supp. 2d 382,
392 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[A]spects of the BDP Photograph that necessarily flow from its
idea are not protectible. Under the doctrine of scènes à faire, elements of an image that
flow naturally and necessarily from the choice of a given concept cannot be claimed as
original.”); Gentieu, 255 F. Supp. 2d at 848 (“Although in some cases the contrived
positioning of a subject has been protected the poses are not copyrightable elements where
they follow necessarily from the choice of the subject matter or are otherwise unoriginal.”).
51
Only reproductions of a copyrighted work that are “copies” may constitute
infringement, and “copies” are “fixed” in material form such that they are sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit them to be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated
for a period of more than transitory duration. 17 U.S.C. § 101; see also Cartoon Network
LP, v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 129 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that the copyrighted
works were not “fixed” in the buffers for a period of more than transitory duration because
they resided there for no more than 1.2 seconds before being automatically overwritten).
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implicate the video’s protectable aspects,52 and such non-expressive
use may fall within the text and data mining exception to copyright
infringement.53
If Condé Nast can establish improper appropriation, it then falls
on Francis and Howe to argue that, nevertheless, they are shielded
from copyright infringement liability by the doctrine of fair use.
In the United States, fair use is codified as a four-factor analysis: (1)
the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2)
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;

52
See, e.g., Amanda Levendowski, How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence’s
Implicit Bias Problem, 93 WASH. L. REV. 579 (2018); Benjamin Sobel, Artificial
Intelligence’s Fair Use Crisis, 41 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 45, 51 (2017); Michael W. Carroll,
Copyright and the Progress of Science: Why Text and Data Mining Is Lawful, 53 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 893 (2019); Benjamin Sobel, A Taxonomy of Training Data: Disentangling
the Mismatched Rights, Remedies, and Rationales for Restricting Machine Learning, in
A.I. & INTELL. PROP. (Reto Hilty, Jyh-An Lee, Kung-Chung Liu, eds., Oxford Univ. Press)
(forthcoming 2020).
53
See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining
that the use of copyrighted images for thumbnail images in a visual search engine is
transformative because it serves an entirely different function than the owner’s original
images, it does not supplant the need for the originals, and the use benefits the public by
enhancing internet information gathering techniques); Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp.
2d 1106, 1119 (D. Nev. 2006) (ruling that a search engine allowing users to access
copyrighted works through cached links is transformative because it serves a different and
socially important purpose than that served by the original works); Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that a search engine’s
display of thumbnail images of copyrighted works was transformative because it provided
social benefit as an electronic reference tool); A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC,
562 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2009) (ruling that the reproduction of student works by an antiplagiarism technology system, Turnitin, for the purpose of evaluating originality is
transformative fair use); Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 207 (2d Cir. 2015)
(explaining that the reproduction of copyrighted works for Google Books, including
snippet view, was transformative because it enabled users to search for books relevant to
their needs and interests, and this use transformatively provided valuable information about
the original work, rather than replicating protected expression in a manner that provided a
meaningful substitute for the original); Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 96
(2d Cir. 2014) (ruling that digitization of copyrighted works to permit full-text searching
of works, and to create accessible formats for print-disabled users is transformative fair
use).
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and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for, or value
of, the copyrighted work.54
In relation to the first factor, there are several sub-factors to be
considered. The first is whether Francis and Howe engaged in commercial activities. It is possible that they generated some commercial benefit from the display of the Kardashian deepfake in the
Annka Kultys Gallery, and they may have earned advertising revenue from the video if it had remained on YouTube. But Francis has
consistently described his goal as artistic, namely, to use deepfakes
to “subvert” the cultural authority of celebrities, and to expose the
vulnerability of personal data to emerging technologies of power.55
Francis says his artwork is influenced by Simulationism, Jean
Baudrillard’s concept of hyperreality, postmodern semiotics, and
René Magritte’s 1929 Surrealist painting The Treachery of Images.56 The second sub-factor is an inquiry into the transformativeness of the impugned use.57 Although the deepfake is unlikely to
qualify as a parody of the original work,58 its appropriation of celebrity likeness to demonstrate our broader societal vulnerability to data
exploitation and misinformation achieves a different, socially
54

17 U.S.C. § 107.
Charlotte Pyatt, The Art of Interrogation: An Interview with Bill Posters, JUXTAPOZ
(June 19, 2020), https://www.juxtapoz.com/news/street-art/the-art-of-interrogation-aninterview-with-bill-posters/ [https://perma.cc/M8TK-WHSJ].
56
Bill Posters (@bill_posters_uk), INSTAGRAM (June 9, 2020), https://www.insta
gram.com/p/CBOIEh3lhPr/ [https://perma.cc/56Y5-E2KF].
57
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (explaining that the
first factor in a fair use enquiry evaluates whether the new work “adds something new,
with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression,
meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new work is
‘transformative.’ Although such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a
finding of fair use, the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally
furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such works thus lie at the heart of the
fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright…the more
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like
commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”).
58
Id. at 579–81 (explaining that parody “has an obvious claim to transformative value”
but “like any other use, has to work its way through the relevant factors and be judged case
by case in light of the ends of the copyright law.”); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310
(2d Cir. 1992) (“[T]hough the satire need not be only of the copied work and may, as
appellants urge of ‘String of Puppies,’ also be a parody of modern society, the copied work
must be, at least in part, an object of the parody, otherwise there would be no need to
conjure up the original work.”).
55
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valuable purpose than the original work does.59 Additional sub-factors, such as customary use and potential bad faith by the defendant,
are not applicable in this case and are increasingly ignored in fair
use analyses.
The second fair use factor—the nature of the copyrighted
work—shifts the focus from the defendant to the plaintiff. A work
that is unpublished, or is more creative than factual, is considered
more deserving of copyright’s protection—courts are less likely to
accept a fair use defense in these cases.60 Here, the original work
was a video interview with Kim Kardashian, shot in her home in
Hidden Hills, California.61 It follows the traditional format of
Vogue’s “73 Questions” interviews, which are designed to provide
a raw, unfiltered portrayal of a celebrity at home.62 The camera follows the celebrity as they walk around their house in a single continuous take, rattling off responses to rapid-fire questions.63 The importance of the appearance of spontaneity (as opposed to the

59
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454 (1984) (“[T]o
the extent time-shifting expands public access to freely broadcast television programs, it
yields societal benefits.”); Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2013) (“If ‘the secondary
use adds value to the original—if [the original work] is used as raw material, transformed
in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings—this
is the very type of activity that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of
society.’”) (quoting Castle Rock Ent., Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142
(2d Cir. 1998)); Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 96 (2d Cir. 2014) (“A use
is transformative if it does something more than repackage or republish the original
copyrighted work….[A] use does not become transformative by making an “invaluable
contribution to the progress of science and cultivation of the arts.”…Added value or utility
is not the test: a transformative work is one that serves a new and different function from
the original work and is not a substitute for it.”).
60
Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 256 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Two types of distinctions as to
the nature of the copyrighted work have emerged that have figured in the decisions
evaluating the second factor: (1) whether the work is expressive or creative, such as a work
of fiction, or more factual, with a greater leeway being allowed to a claim of fair use where
the work is factual or informational, and (2) whether the work is published or unpublished,
with the scope for fair use involving unpublished works being considerably narrower.”).
61
Kim Kardashian West on Her Growing Family, Law School, and Her Hidden Hills
Home, VOGUE (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.vogue.com/video/watch/73-questions-withkim-kardashian-west [https://perma.cc/7TEF-CED9].
62
Emilia Petrarca, 28 Pressing Questions for the Vogue’s ‘73 Questions’ Guy, THE CUT
(Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.thecut.com/2019/08/vogue-73-questions-voice-behind-thescenes.html [https://perma.cc/TBQ5-7BH3].
63
Id.
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interview feeling staged or rehearsed) means that the editing is minimal and no special effects are used. The more creative aspects of
the video—the lighting, pacing, choreography, and interview questions—are not the elements that have been reproduced in Francis
and Howe’s deepfake. Given that the video is more factual than creative, this factor is likely to weigh in favor of a finding of fair use.
The third factor—the amount and substantiality of the portion
used—is also likely to weigh in favor of fair use. The Kardashian
deepfake appropriates roughly twenty-two seconds of the elevenminute Vogue interview, largely reproducing Kim’s visual appearance, but altering her speech and some of her facial movements.64
This segment represents roughly three percent of the original
work.65 Additionally, the portion used does not go to the heart of the
original: Kim merely answers the same kinds of trivial questions that
feature in the remainder of the interview.66 Finally, the amount taken
was necessary for the transformative purpose of the use; the interview needed to appear sufficiently professional in order for the
deepfake to be convincing.67
The fourth and final factor assesses the effect on the potential
market for, or value of, the copyrighted work. The Kardashian deepfake, released in June 2019, is unlikely to have diminished the audience for the original Vogue video, which has collected over fifty64

Bill Posters (@bill_posters_uk), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/p/ByKguKlP4C/ [https://perma.cc/DC6P-AGUH].
65
The original video is eleven minutes and seventeen seconds long, whereas the deepfake is only twenty-two seconds long. See supra notes 61, 64.
66
Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Even if a copied portion be
relatively small in proportion to the entire work, if qualitatively important, the finder of
fact may properly find substantial similarity.”); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft, Corp.,
821 F. Supp. 616, 624 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (“[Q]uantitatively insignificant infringement may
be substantial if the material is qualitatively important to plaintiff’s work.”).
67
See, e.g., Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 114–16 (2d Cir. 1998)
(“‘[T]he parody must be able to ‘conjure up’ at least enough of the original to make the
object of its critical wit recognizable.’…“‘[O]nce enough has been taken to assure
identification,’ as plainly occurred here, the reasonableness of taking additional aspects of
the original depends on the extent to which the ‘overriding purpose and character’ of the
copy ‘is to parody the original,’ and ‘the likelihood that the parody may serve as a market
substitute for the original.’ That approach leaves the third factor with little, if any, weight
against fair use so long as the first and fourth factors favor the parodist. Since those factors
favor fair use in this case, the third factor does not help Leibovitz, even though the degree
of copying of protectable elements was extensive.”).
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three million views on YouTube since it was released in April
2019.68 Fans seeking an intimate portrayal of Kim Kardashian’s
home and family life would not be discouraged from watching
Vogue’s interview by Francis and Howe’s deepfake. Conversely,
given the revenue generated by their celebrity coverage, Condé Nast
is unlikely to ever develop a market for unflattering celebrity deepfakes, nor is this a use that they would likely license. Accordingly,
the negligible effect of the Kardashian deepfake on the potential
market for, or value of, Vogue’s interview, would likely weigh in
favor of a finding of fair use. Given the four factors analyzed above,
Francis and Howe would likely be protected by fair use in any copyright infringement proceeding brought by Condé Nast.
C. Jay-Z/Billy Joel Deepfake
A similar copyright claim was filed against another celebrity
deepfake in early 2020. In April, Jay-Z’s agency, Roc Nation LLC,
filed copyright claims against two YouTube videos containing deepfake audio of Jay-Z reciting a Shakespearean soliloquy (“To Be or
Not To Be”)69 and Billy Joel’s “We Didn’t Start the Fire.”70 The
creator of the deepfake audio is an artist known as Vocal Synthesis
whose YouTube channel is dedicated to the creation of deepfake
audio generated from unlikely audio-textual pairings (for example,
George W. Bush performing 50 Cent’s “In Da Club”).71 Each
deepfake audio is created by feeding a corpus of audio samples and
transcripts into Google’s open-source neural network system,
Tacotron 2.72 Constructing a training set for a new synthetic voice
68

Vogue, 73 Questions with Kim Kardashian West (ft. Kanye West), YOUTUBE (Apr.
11,
2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QaZ93sibpk0&ab_channel=Vogue
[https://perma.cc/8c2Z-9RFG].
69
Andy Baio, With Questionable Copyright Claim, Jay-Z Orders Deepfake Audio
Parodies off YouTube, WAXY BLOG (Apr. 28, 2020), https://waxy.org/2020/04/jay-zorders-deepfake-audio-parodies-off-youtube/ [https://perma.cc/6E4N-HX83].
70
Id.
71
Id.; see also Nick Statt, Jay Z Tries to Use Copyright Strikes to Remove Deepfaked
Audio of Himself from YouTube, THE VERGE (Apr. 28, 2020, 6:38 PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/4/28/21240488/jay-z-deepfakes-roc-nation-youtuberemoved-ai-copyright-impersonation [https://perma.cc/7BGA-5LPE].
72
Baio, supra note 69. For a technical description of Tacotron 2, see JONATHAN SHEN,
ET AL., NATURAL TTS SYNTHESIS BY CONDITIONING WAVENET ON MEL SPECTROGRAM
PREDICTIONS (2018).
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and training the model to generate it requires over twelve hours of
work, depending on the quality of the audio and the transcript.73
YouTube initially removed both videos, but later reinstated them
after reviewing Roc Nation’s DMCA takedown requests and finding
them to be incomplete.74
The Vocal Synthesis case bears many of the same markings as
the Kardashian deepfake, but is complicated by the entirely synthetic nature of the audio output, and the additional copyrightability
of the input text. Shakespeare’s soliloquy is firmly in the public domain, however Billy Joel’s “We Didn’t Start the Fire” is still protected by copyright.75 Accordingly, even if Vocal Synthesis had paid
the mechanical licensing fee required to produce a cover of “We
Didn’t Start the Fire,”76 he would also require a synchronization license in order to combine his synthetic audio with visual media on
YouTube.77 For now, we will focus on the viability of the copyright
claim made by Roc Nation LLC. It is not known precisely which
Jay-Z songs were fed to the algorithm, but it seems safe to assume
that Roc Nation LLC owns the copyright, for each song, in both the
composition and the sound recording.78 Importantly, none of the
songs are directly reproduced; once the algorithm has learned JayZ’s speech patterns, it generates entirely new, synthetic audio.79
In other words, the “sound” of Jay-Z’s voice is digitally simulated.80
The reproduction of each song within the algorithm’s training
73

Baio, supra note 69.
See Statt, supra note 71.
75
Hamlet, Prince of Denmark was published by William Shakespeare in 1603; under
U.S. copyright law, works published before 1925 are generally in the public domain. Billy
Joel’s “We Didn’t Start the Fire” was released in 1989, and the copyright term under U.S.
law is the life of the author plus seventy years. 17 U.S.C. § 302.
76
17 U.S.C. § 115.
77
The “cover license” available under 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) allows the licensee to make
and distribute a sound recording of the licensed musical composition upon the payment of
a small royalty but it does not include the right to synchronize the composition with visual
media (as occurs on YouTube), and the new arrangement is not permitted to “change the
basic melody or fundamental character of the work.”
78
See, e.g., Waite v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 3d 430, 438 n. 50 (S.D.N.Y.
2020) (“[N]oting that since sound recordings earned copyright protection in 1972,
‘virtually all contracts’ between artists and recording companies include ‘work made for
hire’ provisions.” (quoting NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.03 (2019))).
79
Baio, supra note 69.
80
Id.
74
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dataset would likely fall within the text and data mining exception
to copyright infringement.81 And the exclusive rights in sound recordings do not extend to the creation of sound recordings which
imitate or simulate the original.82 In order for Roc Nation to establish copyright infringement (in the form of comprehensive nonliteral
similarity) it would first need to establish the copyrightability of JayZ’s speech patterns, which seems unlikely.83
Even if Roc Nation could establish copyright infringement, the
highly transformative nature of the deepfakes would likely militate
against any minimal commercial benefit derived from ad revenue on
YouTube.84 Certainly, the second and third factors would weigh
against a finding of fair use; Jay-Z’s songs are highly creative and
we can assume that the model was trained on a large corpus of fulllength songs.85 However, the fourth factor, like the first, would
weigh in favor of a finding of fair use. Neither of the Jay-Z deepfakes would adversely affect the potential market for, or value of,
the original Jay-Z songs and they do not represent a market that Roc
Nation would likely develop (or license) in the future. Given these
81

Posters, supra notes 43–44.
17 U.S.C. § 114(b).
83
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) for a summary of the idea-expression dichotomy, which
renders facts uncopyrightable; see also Sobel, supra note 52.
84
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (“[T]he more
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like
commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”); Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v.
ComicMix LLC, 256 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1106, 1109 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (“[I]n the present case
there is no question that Defendants created their work for profit. Although this weighs
against Defendants in this factor, its weight is slight given both the transformative nature
of the work…and the fact that Boldly does not supplant the market for Go! or the other
relevant Dr. Seuss works.”) (“This case presents an important question regarding the
emerging ‘mash-up’ culture where artists combine two independent works in a new and
unique way…if fair use was not viable in a case such as this, an entire body of highly
creative work would be effectively foreclosed.”).
85
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 221 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Notwithstanding
the reasonable implication of Factor Three that fair use is more likely to be favored by the
copying of smaller, rather than larger, portions of the original, courts have rejected any
categorical rule that a copying of the entirety cannot be a fair use. Complete unchanged
copying has repeatedly been found justified as fair use when the copying was reasonably
appropriate to achieve the copier’s transformative purpose and was done in such a manner
that it did not offer a competing substitute for the original…. As with HathiTrust, not only
is the copying of the totality of the original reasonably appropriate to Google’s
transformative purpose, it is literally necessary to achieve that purpose.”).
82
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considerations, Vocal Synthesis’ Jay-Z deepfakes would likely be
protected by fair use.
D. Democratizing Creative Production
The evolution of fair use jurisprudence—and its focus on transformativeness—seems consistent with the protection of the artistic
deepfakes described above. However, the more difficult question is
whether the protection of deepfakes is consistent with the overarching policy goals of the copyright regime. Although the Constitution
gave Congress the power to distribute time-limited monopolies to
authors and inventors to “promote the progress of science and useful
arts,”86 opinions on the proper purpose of copyright still vary
widely. There are those who emphasize the importance of rewarding
creators with property interests (fairness theory), while others prioritize the protection of the psychic bond between creator and creation
(personality theory).87 Some scholars emphasize the importance of
incentivizing the production and distribution of intellectual products
as public goods (welfare theory), and still others believe that copyright’s purpose is to sustain a just and attractive culture that contributes to human flourishing (cultural theory).88
Of these groups, proponents of the cultural theory of copyright
law are most likely to advocate for the protection of artistic deepfakes such as those described above. The ability of artists like Francis, Howe, and Vocal Synthesis to subvert and remix popular culture
promotes diverse self-expression, and public discourse. Rather than
remain passive consumers of cultural works, digital technology allows these individuals to become active co-creators by transforming
copyrighted works in unconventional ways.89 This decentralization
86

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See generally William W. Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS
IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY (Stephen Munzer et al. eds., 2001).
88
Id.
89
See generally Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic
Approach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 236
(1996); Stacey Lantagne, Mutating Internet Memes and the Amplification of Copyright’s
Authorship Challenges, 17 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 221 (2018); Cathay Smith, Beware the
Slender Man: Intellectual Property and Internet Folklore, 70 FL. L. REV. 601 (2018); Niva
Elkin-Koren, Copyright in a Digital Ecosystem: A User Rights Approach, in COPYRIGHT
87
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of the meaning-making process disrupts the commercial paradigm
of tightly controlled creativity,90 and dismantles institutional hierarchies of knowledge production and ownership.91 It also provokes
important social discourse about who we are as a society, and who
we want to be. All of these benefits would be chilled by the specter
of a copyright infringement suit. And as evidenced by the removal
of the Kardashian deepfake from YouTube, many creators will not
challenge a wrongful takedown of their content. If the reproduction
and manipulation of copyrighted content for the purpose of deepfake
creation was not shielded by fair use, copyright infringement liability could present a nontrivial barrier to the creation and dissemination of artistic deepfakes.
II. Individual and Collective Harms

A. Our Vulnerability to Misinformation
As mentioned in the Introduction, it is important to distinguish
between the individual and collective harms generated by the dissemination of deepfakes.92 An individual whose likeness has been
appropriated for deepfake pornography, or other similarly harmful
content, may suffer severe emotional distress, psychological harm,
and reputational injury. On the other hand, the collective harms generated by deepfakes tend to be exacerbations of existing social problems. Online harassment of women, for example, is as old as the

LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS (Ruth Okediji ed., 2017); LAWRENCE
LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY (2008);
Teresa Scassa, Acknowledging Copyrightʹs Illegitimate Offspring: User-Generated
Content and Canadian Copyright Law, in THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY: HOW THE
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA SHOOK THE FOUNDATIONS OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW
(Michael Geist ed., 2013).
90
See, e.g., Debora Halbert, Mass Culture and the Culture of the Masses: A Manifesto
for User-Generated Rights, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 921, 924–26 (2009).
91
See, e.g., David J. Gunkel, What Does it Matter Who Is Speaking? Authorship,
Authority, and the Mashup, POPULAR MUSIC AND SOCIETY, at 71 (Feb. 22, 2012).
92
See supra Introduction. Note also the harms associated with the threat of such
dissemination, for the purposes of blackmail and other kinds of exploitation.
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internet itself,93 but the ease and accessibility of deepfake pornography has increased the severity of this harassment and tied it explicitly to the exploitation and stigmatization of female sexuality. Such
harassment ultimately reduces female participation in digital public
spaces,94 and degrades public discourse. Efforts to reduce such harassment require not only the removal of (individual) pornographic
deepfakes, but broader measures aimed at the roots of systemic
misogyny, and sexism.
Another collective harm associated with the dissemination of
deepfakes is a reduction in our capacity to differentiate authentic
from inauthentic content. Existing scholarship is rife with inflammatory claims that hyperrealistic deepfakes will undermine public
safety, compromise international relations, and jeopardize national
security.95 Deepfakes are certainly capable of all these things, but so
are many other kinds of misinformation. And it is this root cause—
our societal vulnerability to misinformation—that must be addressed. Have we fostered such uncritical reliance on video footage
that we would make significant decisions on the basis of uncorroborated evidence? Has societal trust in public institutions fallen so
significantly that a single deepfake could cause mass unrest? And if
this is the case, how did we get here? Like online harassment, our
vulnerability to misinformation has deep roots. Human society has
long grappled with inauthenticity in different forms. For as long as

93
See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Internet Defamation as Profit Center: The Monetization of
Online Harassment, 32 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 383 (2009); Alice E. Marwick & Robyn
Caplan, Drinking Male Tears: Language, the Manosphere, and Networked Harassment,
18 FEMINIST MEDIA STUDIES 543 (2018); Jessica Vitak et al., Identifying Women’s
Experiences with and Strategies for Mitigating Negative Effects of Online Harassment, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 20TH ACM CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE
WORK AND SOCIAL COMPUTING 1231 (2017).
94
For a description of incidents concerning Rana Ayyub, an investigative journalist in
India, and media critic Anita Sarkeesian, see Drew Harwell, Fake-Porn Videos are Being
Weaponized to Harass and Humiliate Women: ‘Everybody is a Potential Target,’ THE
WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/
12/30/fake-porn-videos-are-being-weaponized-harass-humiliate-women-everybody-is-pot
ential-target/ [https://perma.cc/ 3QGB-2LWU]; see also Marjan Nadim & Audun Fladmoe,
Silencing Women? Gender and Online Harassment, SOC. SCI. COMPUT. REV. 245 (2019).
95
See Danielle Citron & Robert Chesney, Deepfakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy,
Democracy, and National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1753, 1784 (2019) (“Foreign policy
could be changed in response to convincing deep fakes and forgeries.”).
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people have valorized certain things—original artwork, designer
handbags, wild ginseng96—inauthentic versions have existed to
meet excess demand,97 and copyright law has been used to remove
some of those counterfeits, as discussed in Part I. As it turns out,
knowledge of the external world is also a highly-valued commodity,
and so we are plied with different versions of it, each competing for
ascendance.98 Ultimately, this competition is about power—about
who gets to decide what is “real” and what is “fake”—and once we
understand this, we can recognize deepfakes as simply the latest
weapon in that struggle for epistemological supremacy. To overcome our vulnerability to misinformation, then, we have to combat
not only deepfakes, but the modern conditions that have nurtured
them, including: shortened attention spans, a 24-hour news cycle,
widespread dependence on digital networks (heightened by coronavirus quarantine restrictions), increasing social isolation, low levels
of media literacy, social media echo chambers, political polarization, and a loss of trust in both scientific and political institutions.99
Strengthening our capacity to identify (and counter) misinformation
will require engagement on all of these fronts, not just the sporadic
take-down of individual deepfakes.
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See, e.g., Q. Lu et al., Study on Nondestructive Discrimination of Genuine and
Counterfeit Wild Ginsengs Using NIRS, 59 EUR. PHYSICAL J. APPLIED PHYSICS, July 2012,
at 1.
97
See, e.g., David Lowenthal, Counterfeit Art: Authentic Fakes, 1 IJCP 79, 79 (1992)
(“[C]ounterfeiting is relative; measures of truth vary with time and place. What is fake or
forged for some is ‘real’ or authentic for others…. The roots of originality and
counterfeiting, of truth and falsehood, are inextricably intertwined.”); John Henry
Merryman, Counterfeit Art, 1 IJCP 27, 28–29 (1992) (discussing whether a perfect
counterfeit, if indistinguishable from the original, is as good as the original, and should be
valued as such).
98
For philosophical meditations on metaphysical uncertainty, see e.g., RENÉ
DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY (Hackett Publ’g Co. 3d ed. 1993); Peter
Unger, Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism, 87 PHIL. REV. 154 (1978); Manley Thompson,
Book Reviews, 94 ETHICS 143 (1983) (reviewing HILARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND
HISTORY (1981)).
99
See, e.g., Stephan Lewandowsky et al., Beyond Misinformation: Understanding and
Coping with the “Post-Truth” Era, 6 J. APPLIED RSCH. IN MEMORY & COGNITION 353
(2017); Alexei Abrahams & Gabrielle Lim, Repress/Redress: What the “War on Terror”
Can Teach Us About Fighting Misinformation, THE HARV. KENNEDY SCH.
MISINFORMATION REV., July 22, 2020, at 1(3).
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B. The History of Ocularcentrism
Another factor which allows deepfakes to exploit our vulnerability to misinformation is the persistence of the normative claim
that seeing is believing.100 The epistemological priority of sight is
deeply embedded in the Western history of ocularcentrism. The ancient Greeks prioritized sight over other senses due to its simultaneity and perceived objectivity; the ability to avoid direct interaction
with the object of your gaze was believed to enhance the neutrality
of your perception.101 The ocularcentrism of early Greek thought
was also present in medieval Christian society, which used images
to convert new believers and educate the faithful.102 In a largely
illiterate society, biblical events were visually represented in stained
glass windows, bas-reliefs, frescoes, altarpieces, and wooden carvings.103 During the Renaissance, these lessons about the persuasive
quality of visual representation were reapplied for secular purposes.104 Vision “became the dominant sense in the modern world,
even as it came to serve new masters.”105
Renaissance artists used the illusion of perspective to render
three-dimensional space on a flat, two-dimensional canvas.106 The
flattened compositions of medieval art were replaced by the illusion
of depth,107 and the many vantage points of medieval scenes were
replaced by a single, sovereign eye.108 This “monocular” or fixed
point of beholding the world obscured the bodies of the painter and
the viewer, thereby removing their emotional involvement in the
depicted scene and giving it the illusion of detached reality.109 Perspectival art was so widely adopted that its technique of visual

100

See, e.g., Christopher J. Buccafusco, Gaining/Losing Perspective on the Law, or
Keeping Visual Evidence in Perspective, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 609, 646 (2004) (“Once the
public has become convinced of the transparency of a given medium, it will no longer
scrutinize the products of that medium for inconsistencies and biases.”).
101
JAY, supra note 4, at 23.
102
Id. at 30.
103
Id. at 30.
104
Id. at 32.
105
Id. at 32.
106
Id. at 35.
107
Lauwrens, supra note 4, at 30–31.
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JAY, supra note 4, at 36.
109
Id. at 36.
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representation became synonymous with vision itself.110 Cartesian
perspectivalism reflected the Western Enlightenment ideals of
empirical, scientific observation of the external world, detached
from the corrupting influence of the sensual body.111 Sight was critical for the scientific project of the early naturalists, meticulously
observing, measuring, and classifying different specimens so that
‘seeing’ from a distance become synonymous with scientific
knowledge.112 Probing vision characterized the early scientific
revolution, liberating humans from “blind obedience” to the “voices
of the past” (the interpreters of religious texts), and allowing them
to observe the natural world for themselves, especially with the
invention of optical instruments.113
In the early nineteenth century, the invention of the camera further secured the primacy of vision. The introduction of the daguerreotype in 1839 produced a “cult of images” which flooded mass advertising, in addition to artistic and scientific books.114 This led to
the “democratization of visual experience,” or the incorporation of
“low” subjects in the canon of what could be visually represented.115
The daguerreotype was heralded as a direct transcription of reality,
“produced by the operation of natural laws and not by the hand of
man.”116 The “natural” chemical process of sensitizing a silvercoated copper plate to light through iodine and bromine exposure
(and suspending the light-exposed plate over a dish of heated

110

Id. at 54; see, e.g., Buccafusco, supra note 100, at 639, 645 (“The use of linear
perspective, as standardized by the Renaissance painters, has disembodied the creative
mechanism of image construction and presented images as direct transcriptions of the
externally visible world. By erasing the human creator, the process of image creation looks
less like a system of communication than a natural process for the gathering of visual data,
and the image created is thought of not as a sign, but as a perception….A work in linear
perspective is assumed to be a direct and truthful depiction created by an automatic and
natural process the success of which need not be questioned.”); see also Lev Manovich,
The Automation of Sight: From Photography to Computer Vision, in ELEC. CULTURE 230
(Timothy Druckery ed., 1996).
111
JAY, supra note 4, at 67; see also Lauwrens, supra note 4, at 29–30.
112
Lauwrens, supra note 4, at 30.
113
JAY, supra note 4, at 39-40.
114
Id. at 73.
115
Id.
116
Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth: Photographic Evidence and the Power of
Analogy, 10 YALE J. L. & HUMAN 1, 16 (1998).
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mercury) allowed Nature to simply “reproduce herself.”117 But it did
not take long for the manipulability of photography to be realized.
At the 1855 Universal Exposition in Paris, the audience was shocked
to learn that photographs could be retouched or combined to form a
composite image.118 In 1869, photographer William H. Mumler was
charged with fraud for selling “spirit” photographs of deceased
individuals that had been produced using double exposures.119
In 1870, Eugène Appert’s fabricated photographs of violent antigovernment protestors (“Communards”) were used as state propaganda.120 And in 1899, Le Siècle published a frontpage article describing “The Lies of Photography.”121
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the hegemony of
Cartesian perspectivalism and other “spectatorial” epistemologies
began to wane in favor of alternative approaches that exposed the
“culturally mediated” nature of sight.122 Twentieth-century France
was characterized by “antiocular discourse” and the “antiretinal” art
of Marcel Duchamp.123 Philosophers began to problematize the unmediated, atemporal, and decorporealized notion of perspective,124
arguing instead that every viewpoint was value-laden, rather than
detached, and projective, rather than merely receptive.125 The declining ontological primacy of sight was accelerated by the First
World War and the Western Front’s “bewildering landscape of indistinguishable, shadowy shapes, illuminated by lightning flashes
of blinding intensity, and then obscured by phantasmagoric, often
gas-induced haze.”126 The unreliability of sight, and the ease of visual disorientation, heightened the importance of non-ocular senses.
The Surrealists, who were deeply affected by their wartime experiences,127 sought to suppress the rational self through “sensual

117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127

Id.
JAY, supra note 4, at 75.
Mnookin, supra note 116, at 14.
JAY, supra note 4, at 81.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 95.
Id.
Id. at 112.
Id. at 113.
Id. at 130.
Id. at 138.
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derangement.”128 They challenged the integrity of visual experience
through techniques such as collage, frottage, decalcomania, and
fumage.129
Increasing awareness of the subjectivity of vision was reflected
in Jean-Paul Sartre’s phenomenology of sight, which displayed a
deep distrust of visual illusions and the “treachery” of being defined
by the gaze of others.130 Sartre emphasized the way in which the
objectification of the gaze sustained racist and imperialist domination.131 Similarly, Maurice Merleau-Ponty rejected the epistemology of the “objective spectator” whose vision was “wholly independent of his constitutive powers.”132 Rather, visual experience
was subjective and constructed from “orders of signification” in
which humans were deeply embedded.133 Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of subjectivity insisted that the observer was always part of
the observed—embodied in the world, rather than disembodied and
disinterested.134 Similarly, Jacques Lacan emphasized the social
construction of the visual field, and the sum of discourses that occupied the space between the subject and the world.135 Meanwhile,
Michel Foucault and Guy Debord highlighted the ways in which
ocularcentrism promoted institutions of surveillance, spectacle, and
social control.136 In Discipline and Punish, Foucault described the
ubiquitous, disciplining gaze of the Panopticon, and its ceaseless
surveillance.137 Looking was a form of power, exerted by the subject
upon the object, with detached epistemological authority.138
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Id. at 141.
Id. at 145.
Id. at 166.
Id. at 174.
Id. at 178.
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Lauwrens, supra note 4, at 37.
Id. at 32.
JAY, supra note 4, at 229.
Id. at 240.
Lauwrens, supra note 4, at 29.
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In the late 1960s and early 1970s, antiocular discourse shifted its
attention to the “material apparatuses” of photography and film.139
Roland Barthes understood the allure of photography: “You are the
only one who can never see yourself except as an image; you never
see your eyes unless they are dulled by the gaze they rest upon the
mirror or the lens . . . even and especially for your own body, you
are condemned to the repertoire of its images.”140 Barthes railed
against its distorting effects: “[O]nce I feel myself observed by the
lens, everything changes: I constitute myself in the process of ‘posing,’ I instantaneously make another body for myself, I transform
myself in advance into an image.”141 Barthes emphasized the paradoxical contrast between the photograph’s denotative capacity to
imitate the world (its “analogical perfection”), and its second-order
connotative capacity to signify (its semiotic overlay).142
Like photography, film also promoted the “ideology of the visible,” or the hegemony of the eye.143 By the early 1960s, the Barthesian “death of the author”144 was mirrored in the “death of the auteur” within film, and semiological efforts to expose the devices of
cinema’s “reality effect.”145 Part of film’s analogical power
stemmed from the movement of images and its simulation of “atemporal instantaneity.”146 The monocular perspective of the camera
mimicked the Cartesian perspectivalism of traditional painting,
which privileged the “fixed, monologic eye,” and disincarnated the
painter and viewer in order to give the appearance of detached
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JAY, supra note 4, at 260; see also Mnookin, supra note 116, at 2 (noting that the
photograph has “long been perceived to have a special power of persuasion, grounded both
in the lifelike quality of its depictions and in its claim to mechanical objectivity”); ROLAND
BARTHES, CAMERA LUCIDA (Richard Howard trans., 1st American ed. Hill & Wang 1981);
Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, in
ILLUMINATIONS (Harry Zohn trans., Hannah Arendt ed., 1969); Lorraine Daston & Peter
Galison, The Image of Objectivity, 40 REPRESENTATIONS, SPECIAL ISSUE: SEEING AUTUMN
81 (1992); SUSAN SONTAG, ON PHOTOGRAPHY (1977).
140
JAY, supra note 4, at 265.
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Id. at 267.
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Id. at 262.
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Id. at 273.
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ROLAND BARTHES, IMAGE, MUSIC, TEXT (Stephen Heath trans., Hill & Wang 1978).
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observation.147 Rather than conveying multiple, and perhaps different, points of view, the moving camera erased any “dispersed and
contradictory subjectivities” to produce a singular, disembodied
gaze.148 The viewer identified with the omniscient camera eye,
producing a hyperreal sense of reality in which subject and object
collapse into a “state of oneness with the world.”149 The cinematic
screen functioned as a mirror, reinforcing the viewer’s specular
identity and the Lacanian role of mirror reflection in “the visual constitution of the self.”150 Film theorists such as Christian Metz, who
worked to expose the ideological underpinnings of the cinematic
apparatus, emphasized the object’s disavowal of awareness of being
viewed as a key feature of film’s “reality effect.”151 By the end of
the twentieth century, the eye had been deconstructed as an “innocent” medium of knowledge,152 and philosophers emphasized the
“culturally mediated” nature of visual perception.153
The history of Western ocularcentrism helps to explain both the
persistence of the normative claim that seeing is believing, and the
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Id. at 275.
Id. at 275.
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Id. at 277.
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Id. at 205, 278.
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Id. at 272.
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Id. at 348.
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Id. at 95. There is longstanding legal insecurity regarding the admissibility and
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impartial verdicts. See, e.g., The Photograph as a False Witness, 10 VA. L.J. 644, 645–46
(1886); H. Vogel, Photography and Truth, 6 PHILA. PHOTOGRAPHER 262, 262 (1869); H.J.
Morton, The Trials of the Photographer, 2 PHILA. PHOTOGRAPHER 36, 36 (1865); Judicial
Photography, 15 PHOTOGRAPHIC J. 107, 107 (1872); Buccafusco, supra note 100, at 617;
Martin Jay, Must Justice Be Blind? The Challenges of Images to the Law, in LAW AND THE
IMAGE, THE AUTHORITY OF ART AND THE AESTHETICS OF LAW 78 (Costas Douzinas &
Lynda Nead eds., 1999); Craig Murphy, Computer Simulations and Video Re-Enactments:
Fact, Fantasy and Admission Standards, 17 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 145, 163 (1990); John
Selbak, Comment, Digital Litigation: The Prejudicial Effects of Computer Generated
Animation in the Courtroom, 9 HIGH TECH. L.J. 337, 357 (1994); Elan E. Weinreb, Note,
‘Counselor, Proceed With Caution’: The Use of Integrated Evidence Presentation Systems
and Computer-Generated Evidence in the Courtroom, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 393, 395–96
(2001).
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variety of visual technologies that have exploited this norm.154
Contextualizing deepfakes within this visual history helps us to conceive them as simply a new iteration of a very old problem. Yet,
few techniques of visual manipulation have been met with such
outrage and condemnation. So, what makes deepfakes different?
The answer may lie in the synchrony of audio and visual elements.
A Photoshopped image of an Iranian missile launch, for example,
appeals only to a viewer’s static sight.155 But a deepfake of President
Obama introducing a deep learning course at MIT,156 or of Tom
Cruise golfing on TikTok,157 appeals both to our visual and auditory
senses in a manner that seems to defy deception. We are watching
them speak, as we are hearing their words. The synchrony of audio
and visual elements implicates not just one sense, but two. Psychological research on the emotional responses produced by unimodal
(auditory or visual) and bimodal (auditory and visual) sensory
154

In 1935, Leni Riefenstahl transfigured the “reality” of the Third Reich, while
apparently recording it, for her Nazi propaganda film, Triumph of the Will. In 2008, the
media arm of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, Sepah News, published a photograph of the
simultaneous launch of four missiles, which appeared on the cover of the Chicago Tribune,
the Financial Times, and the Los Angeles Times. In fact, only three missiles launched that
day; the fourth had been digitally added. Earlier this year, U.S. President Donald Trump
posted an inauthentic video on Twitter that had been manipulated to falsely represent a
CNN broadcast. These examples, while anecdotal, highlight the longstanding vulnerability
of visual media to manipulation, even without the use of deepfake technology. See, e.g.,
Ken Kelman, Propaganda as Vision: Triumph of the Will, LOGOS 2.4 (Fall 2003); Hany
Farid, Seeing Is Not Believing, IEEE SPECTRUM (Aug. 1, 2009, 12:00 AM),
https://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/software/seeing-is-not-believing [https://perma.cc/
MFK8-ZYUK]; Kate Conger, Twitter Labels Trump Tweet About ‘Racist Baby’ as
Manipulated Media, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
06/18/technology/trump-tweet-baby-manipulated.html [https://perma.cc/4E26-F5VA].
155
See, e.g., MIA FINEMAN, FAKING IT: MANIPULATED PHOTOGRAPHY BEFORE
PHOTOSHOP 5 (2012); Mike Nizza & Patrick Whitty, In Image of Iran’s Power, There’s
Less Than Meets the Eye, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/
2008/07/11/world/middleeast/11missile.html [https://perma.cc/93LD-RTG9].
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Alexander Amini, Barack Obama: Intro to Deep Learning MIT 6.S191, YOUTUBE
(Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l82PxsKHxYc [https://perma.cc/
V3AB-3JDW].
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Alex Hern, ‘I Don't Want to Upset People’: Tom Cruise Deepfake Creator Speaks
Out, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 5, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/mar/05/how-started-tom-cruise-deepfake-tiktok-videos
[https://perma.cc/2RRH-FMEB]; James Vincent, Tom Cruise Deepfake Creator Says
Public Shouldn’t Be Worried About ‘One-Click Fakes,’ THE VERGE (Mar. 5, 2021),
https://www.theverge.com/2021/3/5/22314980/tom-cruise-deepfake-tiktok-videos-ai-impersonator-chris-ume-miles-fisher [https://perma.cc/8EAD-PJXT].

2021]

OCULARCENTRISM AND DEEPFAKES

1071

experience suggests that the combination of sensory elements affects our response to individual stimuli.158 Our perception of events
or objects in the external world depends upon their stimulation of
our senses; for example, we experience a passing car through sight
and sound.159 Deepfakes harness the hyperrealism of multisensory
experience, and our familiarity with the co-occurrence of speech
sounds, and visible changes in an individual’s articulatory facial
musculature.160 The audiovisual congruence of deepfakes therefore
increases their persuasive effect on the viewer, relative to unimodal
techniques of visual media manipulation, such as Photoshop.
As deepfakes test the limits of society’s tolerance for visual
manipulation, they force us to confront our history of ocularcentrism
and to interrogate the utility of the normative claim that seeing is
believing. Our overreliance on the visual world as our primary
source of knowledge and meaning has had far-reaching consequences.161 For example, the overwhelming credibility of visual
evidence has incentivized widespread state surveillance for evidence of wrongdoing,162 as evidenced by the ubiquity of CCTV
cameras.163 The power to observe—to make visible—is the power
to control, and modern surveillance technologies extend the dominance of the disembodied gaze.164 Continuous state surveillance,
in turn, erodes public trust in institutions and exacerbates our
158

Annabel J. Cohen, How Music Influences the Interpretation of Film and Video:
Approaches from Experimental Psychology, in PERSPECTIVES IN SYSTEMATIC MUSICOLOGY
15–36 (R. A. Kendall & R. W. H. Savage eds., 2005).
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96 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977); Apple Igrek, Review: Gary
Shaprio, Archaeologies of Vision: Foucault and Nietszche on Seeing and Saying, 3
FOUCAULT STUD. 132 (2005) (reviewing GARY SHAPIRO, ARCHAEOLOGIES OF VISION:
FOUCAULT AND NIETZSCHE ON SEEING AND SAYING (2005)).
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See, e.g., Kelly Gates, The Cultural Labor of Surveillance: Video Forensics, Computational Objectivity, and The Production of Visual Evidence, SOC. SEMIOTICS, Mar. 12,
2013, at 242 (2013).
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Christopher Taylor, Visual Surveillance: Contemporary Sociological Issues at 227
(1997) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Nevada) (on file with University Libraries,
University of Nevada Las Vegas); see also Donncha Kavanagh, The Limits of
Visualisation: Ocularcentrism and Organization, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO
VISUAL ORGANIZATION (Emma Bell et al., eds., 2013).
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vulnerability to misinformation. Conversely, of course, ocularcentrism is also instrumentalized against the state by its citizens to expose wrongdoing by public officials.165 The nationwide protests
against police brutality triggered by the footage of George Floyd’s
murder reflect this phenomenon.166 If bystander footage of this kind
could be dismissed as a deepfake, criminal acts might go unpunished,167 and social movements might falter. This alone provides a
compelling justification for maintaining the credibility of visual evidence.168
And yet—it would be naïve to rest our hopes on visual evidence
alone. From Selma’s “Bloody Sunday” (1965),169 to the beating of
Rodney King (1991),170 and the murders of Eric Garner (2015),171
and George Floyd (2020),172 the history of visual evidence demonstrates that filming police violence does not end police violence.
The ubiquity of body cameras—and bystanders with smartphones—

165

See, e.g., Sam Gregory, Cameras Everywhere: Ubiquitous Video Documentation of
Human Rights, New Forms of Video Advocacy, and Considerations of Safety, Security,
Dignity, and Consent, 2 J. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 191, 196–98 (2010).
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See, e.g., Wesley Morris, The Videos That Rocked America. The Song That Knows
Our Rage, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/03/arts/georgefloyd-video-racism.html [https://perma.cc/K9CS-YHC9]; Alex Altman, Why the Killing of
George Floyd Sparked an American Uprising, TIME (June 4, 2020, 6:49 AM),
https://time.com/5847967/george-floyd-protests-trump/ [https://perma.cc/V88P-KEUG].
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See, e.g., Jeannie Suk Gersen, The Vital Role of Bystanders in Convicting Derek
Chauvin, The New Yorker (April 21, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-vital-role-of-bystanders-in-convicting-derek-chauvin
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at 888.
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74 (Vivian Carol Sobchack ed., 1996).
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N.Y.P.D. Officer, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/
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has not altered police behavior.173 Nor has careful, frame-by-frame
analysis of body camera footage overcome decades of qualified immunity jurisprudence.174 As Ethan Zuckerman explains, the idea that
police violence, like other information problems, could simply be
solved by an increase in data flows is a “techno-utopian fantasy.”175
Individuals “armed with images” have not been able to effect systemic change.176 This is not to say that credible video footage bears
no utility whatsoever; rather, that focusing disproportionately on acquiring (and disseminating) visual evidence of social problems can
distract us from dismantling the (less visible) structures of power
that benefit from their persistence.177 The science of climate change,
for example, has been so fiercely repudiated by powerful industries
that even the evidence of their own eyes (e.g., the charred Californian coastline) has not convinced climate change deniers otherwise.178 In other words, information alone, unharnessed to structures
of power, cannot effect social change.179
If deepfakes force us to interrogate our relationship with visual
evidence, and the social utility of ocularcentrism, such conversations are long overdue. Are we still willing to accept the price of
ocularcentrism, and if we are, what additional safeguards must be
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introduced to preserve the credibility of visual evidence?180 What
investments must be made to improve media literacy,181 and
strengthen authentication protocols? How will we maintain the credibility of visual evidence amid the increasing ubiquity of visual
manipulation technologies, such as video-editing filters on Instagram and Tik Tok?182 Unfortunately, as Part III will demonstrate,
current legislative initiatives avoid these existential questions, and
focus instead on developing Band-Aid solutions to the distribution
of specific deepfakes.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

The public and private sectors have proposed a variety of
measures to address the unique challenges posed by deepfakes. The
public sector offers legal remedies, while the private sector offers
policy and technological solutions. Beginning with the public sector, the first thing to note is that any sweeping legislative prohibition
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evidence, rather than dismiss the utility of visual evidence altogether. See, e.g., Jacqueline
Marks Bibicoff, Seeing Is Believing? The Need for Cautionary Jury Instructions on the
Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 11 SAN FERN. VAL. L. REV. 95, 98
(1983).
181
See, e.g., Rachel Rodgers et al., When Seeing Is Not Believing: An Examination of the
Mechanisms Accounting for the Protective Effect of Media Literacy on Body Image, 81
SEX ROLES 87, 87–96 (2019) (discussing how skepticism concerning the extent to which
images portray reality can help protect female adolescents from the harmful effects of thinideal internalization); Colin C Barton, Critical Literacy in the Post-Truth Media
Landscape, 17 POL’Y FUTURES IN EDUC. 1024 (2019).
182
See, e.g., Jiayang Fan, China’s Selfie Obsession, THE NEW YORKER (Dec. 11, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/12/18/chinas-selfie-obsession
[https://perma.cc/HY7T-U9PD] (“In the same way that you would point out to your friend
if her shirt was misbuttoned, or if her pants were unzipped, you should have the decency
to Meitu her face if you are going to share it with your friends….”); Jia Tolentino, The Age
NEW
YORKER
(Dec.
12,
2019),
of
Instagram
Face,
THE
https://www.newyorker.com/culture/decade-in-review/the-age-of-instagram-face
[https://perma.cc/Z39K-CXE8]; Orla Pentelow, FaceTime Timothée Chalamet Thanks to
the Instagram Filter You’ve Been Dreaming Of, BUSTLE (May 15, 2020),
https://www.bustle.com/p/your-facetiming-timothee-chalamet-fantasy-just-came-truevia-this-instagram-filter-22906687 [https://perma.cc/G23F-P6WU]; Christianna Silva, A
Theater Student Gets Supersized Attention After Superhero Video Goes Viral, NPR (July
5, 2020, 7:53 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/07/05/887310065/a-theater-student-getssupersized-attention-after-superhero-video-goes-viral [https://perma.cc/QM4C-WNP2].
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on the dissemination of deepfakes would be incompatible with the
free speech protections of the First Amendment.183 Since 1964, the
Supreme Court has only strengthened protection for falsehoods,184
including intentional falsehoods, which cannot be restricted unless
they cause serious harm that cannot be avoided through more
speech-protective means—e.g., counter speech.185 And as Cass

183
There are exceptions from First Amendment protection for “obscenity,” See, e.g.,
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483–88 (1957) (“[T]he unconditional phrasing of the
First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance….[I]mplicit in the history of
the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social
importance….We hold that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected
speech or press….However, sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is
material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest.”); Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (“The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a)
whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’ would find
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest…(b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.”). However, most pornography (and thus deepfake
pornography) would be unlikely to meet the (elusive) legal definition of obscenity. See
generally Douglas Harris, Deepfakes: False Pornography Is Here and the Law Cannot
Protect You, 17 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 99–127 (2019); Spivak, supra note 28, at 364.
184
See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–81 (1964) (noting that the
constitutional protection of the First Amendment “does not turn upon ‘the truth, popularity,
or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered.’…That erroneous statement is
inevitable in free debate, and…must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have
the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need to survive’….The constitutional guarantees require,
we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement
was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not.”); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341–
348 (1974) (“The First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to
protect speech that matters….[T]he States should retain substantial latitude in their efforts
to enforce a legal remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the reputation of a private
individual.…We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States
may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.”) (noting that private
individuals will not have to meet the higher standard of “actual malice” that public officials
must meet).
185
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 725–29 (2012) (“The First Amendment
requires that the Government’s chosen restriction on the speech at issue be “actually
necessary” to achieve its interest….There must be a direct causal link between the
restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented….The Government has not shown, and
cannot show, why counterspeech would not suffice to achieve its interest….The remedy
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Sunstein explains, there are many reasons to protect falsehoods:
state characterizations of “truth” and “untruth” may not always be
trustworthy; fear of punishment for falsity will inevitably chill some
truthful expression; engagement with false statements can provoke
more informed discourse; falsehoods reveal the spectrum of social
perspective on an issue; and driving falsehoods underground can
inadvertently increase their power.186 After Alvarez, the Supreme
Court is likely to permit only carefully tailored restrictions on
certain kinds of harmful deepfakes.187
The legal remedies available to individual victims of deepfakes
fall within civil or criminal liability regimes. With respect to civil
liability, assuming the creator of the deepfake is identifiable and
located within U.S. jurisdiction, the plaintiff may sue for defamation,188 publicity in a false light, intentional infliction of emotional
distress,189 wrongful appropriation of another’s likeness,190 or the
right of publicity.191 Alternatively, if the defendant is unidentifiable,
for speech that is false is speech that is true….In addition, when the Government seeks to
regulate protected speech, the restriction must be the ‘least restrictive means among
available, effective alternatives.’”).
186
Cass Sunstein, Falsehoods and the First Amendment, 33 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 388–426
(2020).
187
Chesney & Keats Citron, supra note 3, at 889.
188
With respect to defamation, most deepfake videos would likely constitute libel
(“printed”) rather than slander (“transitory”) and would probably rise to the level of “actual
malice” required for torts involving public figures. The type of proof necessary will depend
on statutory libel requirements, which vary by state. See Spivak, supra note 28, at 367, 370.
189
This generally requires proof of “extreme and outrageous conduct.” See, e.g., Taliani
v. Resurreccion, 115 N.E.3d 1245, 1254 (Ill. App. 3d. 2018) (“To prevail on a claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must prove the following three elements: (1) that the defendant’s conduct was truly extreme and outrageous, (2) that the
defendant either intended that his conduct would cause severe emotional distress or knew
that there was a high probability that his conduct would do so, and (3) that the defendant’s conduct did in fact cause severe emotional distress.”); Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g
Co., 419 U.S. 245, 248 (1974).
190
For non-celebrities, the tort of wrongful appropriation of the name or likeness of
another may be helpful, but the victim would need to demonstrate economic purpose, for
example, use of the victim’s likeness to endorse or advertise a product. Where no monetary
value is derived, it may be difficult for a deepfake victim to satisfy the elements of wrongful
appropriation. See Spivak, supra note 28, at 381.
191
The right of publicity is generally only useful to celebrities and other public figures
who can clearly demonstrate the commercial value in the exploitation of their name and
likeness. See, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 2d 658, 664, 669 (D.N.J. 2010),
and the many statutes that provide an exception for “newsworthy” material.
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located outside U.S. jurisdiction, or financially unable to meet
a judgment sum, the plaintiff might consider suing the platform
on which the deepfake was distributed. Although platforms are
largely shielded from liability for user-generated content under
the “super immunity”192 offered by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, there are exceptions to this immunity for content
that violates federal criminal law, the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act, or intellectual property law.193 Some scholars have
also advocated amending Section 230 to extend platform liability to harmful deepfakes, similar to the 2018 amendment for sex
trafficking.194
Each of these civil remedies has strengths and weaknesses which
have been extensively catalogued elsewhere195 and do not bear
repeating here. The only point I wish to make is that any successful
use of copyright law to remove revenge pornography does not indicate its use in the removal of pornographic deepfakes.196 The two

192

See Chesney & Citron, supra note 3, at 890.
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e). With respect to the intellectual property exception, courts are
still divided as to whether the text of the statute (“Nothing in this section shall be construed
to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property”) refers to state and federal
law, or just federal law. At multiple points in section 230(e), Congress specified whether
it intended a subsection to apply to state or federal law, so some scholars argue that if
Congress intended the statute to refer only to federal law, it would have specified as such.
On this basis, they argue that the exception covers all IP laws, including state laws relating
to the right of publicity. Accordingly, a deepfake victim could argue that the immunity
provided by section 230 is pierced by a state right of publicity, as an IP right. See Almeida
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[T]here appears to be no
dispute that the right of publicity is a type of intellectual property right.”); see also Spivak,
supra note 28, at 394–95.
194
See, e.g., Citron & Chesney, supra note 95, at 1799 (“Section 230 should be amended
to allow a limited degree of platform liability relating to deep fakes.”).
195
See, e.g., Harris, supra note 183, at 99; Spivak, supra note 28, at 364; Elizabeth
Caldera, Reject the Evidence of Your Eyes and Ears: Deepfakes and the Law of Virtual
Replicants, 50 SETON HALL L. REV. 177, 178 (2019); Jessica Ice, Defamatory Political
Deepfakes and the First Amendment, 70 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 417, 419 (2019); Marc
Jonathan Blitz, Lies, Line Drawing, and Deep Fake News, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 59, 62 (2018);
Rebecca Delfino, Pornographic Deepfakes: The Case for Federal Criminalization of
Revenge Porn’s Next Tragic Act, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 891 (2019).
196
See, e.g., Amanda Levendowski, Using Copyright to Combat Revenge Porn, 3 N.Y.U.
J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 422 (2014); Kaitlan M. Folderauer, Not All Is Fair (Use) in Love
and War: Copyright Law and Revenge Porn, 44 U. BALT. L. REV. 321 (2015); Ann Bartow,
Copyright Law and Pornography, 91 OR. L. REV. 1 (2012).
193
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situations are very different. Revenge pornography generally involves the nonconsensual release of explicit photographs, previously shared between intimate sexual partners.197 If the victim took
those photographs, they generally own the copyright in them.198
Pornographic deepfakes, on the other hand, involve substantial alterations to existing footage in order to create a completely new
work.199 This type of transformative use is likely permitted under
copyright law, despite the fact that it is obviously egregious in the
pornographic context.200 This is because emotional, psychological,
and/or reputational harms are not the intended targets of copyright
relief; copyright’s function as the engine of free expression is to promote the creation and publication of expressive works by protecting
the commercial interests of the author.201 Habitual filing of copyright claims to remove pornographic deepfakes would, over time,
normalize the misuse of copyright law to remove any unwanted
deepfake, and the specter of a copyright claim would chill the creation of beneficial deepfakes. To address the very real and serious
harms caused by pornographic deepfakes, Congress should create
new statutory remedies specifically designed to help individual victims. At the federal level, a bill has been introduced that would create private rights of action for individual deepfake victims.202 At the
state level, both California and New York have passed legislation

197

Levendowski, supra note 196.
Id.
199
Harris, supra note 183, at 109.
200
See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903) (“It
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and
most obvious limits. At the one extreme, some works of genius would be sure to miss
appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had learned
the new language in which their author spoke.…At the other end, copyright would be
denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they
command the interest of any public, they have a commercial value—it would be bold to
say that they have not an aesthetic and educational value- —and the taste of any public is
not to be treated with contempt.”).
201
See, e.g., Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 744–45 (9th Cir. 2015).
202
Defending Each and Every Person from False Appearances by Keeping Exploitation
Subject to Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 3230, 116th Cong. § 2(g) (2019).
198
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allowing individual victims of nonconsensual deepfake pornography to sue for damages.203
With respect to criminal liability, assuming the availability of
both law enforcement resources and prosecutorial will, a deepfake
creator could be prosecuted for violating federal cyberstalking
laws,204 certain impersonation crimes,205 incitement,206 election-related deception,207 or the impersonation of public officials, or candidates for office.208 At the federal level, a bill has been introduced
that would criminalize the production and distribution of pornographic deepfakes, as well as deepfakes designed to cause violence
or physical harm, incite conflict, interfere in an election, or facilitate
criminal conduct.209 At the state level, Virginia and Texas have
passed laws criminalizing nonconsensual deepfake pornography,210
and deepfakes that interfere with elections,211 respectively. Massachusetts has proposed the criminalization of the creation or distribution of deepfakes intended for use in otherwise criminal or tortious
conduct.212 Many of these bills require proof of intent, for example,
that the defendant intended to “humiliate or otherwise harass” the
victim of the pornographic deepfake.213 Such requirements may
shield these bills from First Amendment scrutiny.214
203
See A.B. 602, 2019-2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019); A.B. 5605-C, 2019-2020 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (N.Y. 2019).
204
See 18 U.S.C. § 2261A and analogous state statutes.
205
See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.25(4) (2008) (“Impersonates another by
communication by internet website or electronic means with intent to obtain a benefit or
injure or defraud another, or by such communication pretends to be a public servant in
order to induce another to submit to such authority or act in reliance on such pretense.”).
206
See 18 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(1).
207
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-13-109(1)(a) (“No person shall knowingly make,
publish, broadcast, or circulate or cause to be made, published, broadcasted, or circulated
in any letter, circular, advertisement, or poster or in any other communication any false
statement designed to affect the vote on any issue submitted to the electors at any election
or relating to any candidate for election to public office.”) and analogous state statutes.
208
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 912; H.R. 3230.
209
H.R. 3230 § 2(f).
210
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-386.2 (West 2019).
211
TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 255.004(d) (West 2019).
212
H. 3366, 191st Gen. Ct. (Ma. 2019).
213
See, e.g., H.R. 3230; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-386.2.
214
See, e.g., Louis Tompros et al., The Constitutionality of Criminalizing False Speech
Made on Social Networking Sites in a Post-Alvarez, Social Media-Obsessed World, 31
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 65, 88 (2017).
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Meanwhile, the private sector response has largely taken the
form of policy and technological initiatives. Given the significant
portion of social and political discourse that occurs on digital platforms, the policies enacted by these platforms (unconstrained by the
First Amendment) are highly consequential. In January 2020, Facebook announced that it would remove any “misleading manipulated
media” that had been edited or synthesized “in ways that aren’t apparent to an average person and would likely mislead someone” and
was produced by “artificial intelligence or machine learning.”215 Facebook clarified that this policy would not extend to “parody or satire, or video that has been edited solely to omit or change the order
of words.”216 There are three problems with this approach. First, a
blanket ban of this kind would chill the creation and distribution of
artistic deepfakes of the kind produced by Barnaby Francis, Daniel
Howe, and Vocal Synthesis, unless they were classified by Facebook as parody or satire, and it’s not clear that Facebook should
wield such normative authority. Secondly, for those concerned with
reducing the spread of misinformation, the limited application of the
policy to deepfakes produced by “artificial intelligence or machine
learning” seems both arbitrary and ineffective. As we have seen,
“cheap fakes” such as the slurred video of Nancy Pelosi also carry
significant capacity for harm. Thirdly, reliance on the civic-minded
whims of private enterprise to staunch the spread of misinformation
has
proven
to
be
an
unsustainable
strategy.217
Facebook has consistently been unwilling to sacrifice profit in order
to play the arbiter of truth.218 As its user base increasingly trends

215

Monika Bickert, Enforcing Against Manipulated Media, FACEBOOK (Jan. 6, 2020),
https://about.fb.com/news/2020/01/enforcing-against-manipulated-media/
[https://perma.cc/F55T-FSSW].
216
Id.
217
See, e.g., Sheera Frenkel & Davey Alba, Trump’s Disinfectant Talk Trips Up Sites’
Vows Against Misinformation, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/04/30/technology/trump-coronavirus-social-media.html
[https://perma.cc/3C5J6X3A].
218
See, e.g., Greg Bensinger, Does Zuckerberg Understand How the Right to Free
Speech Works?, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/08/
opinion/facebook-civil-rights-audit.html [https://perma.cc/6Z2P-B26K].
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conservative,219 Facebook has been reluctant to remove any conservative misinformation, even going so far as to label climate
change denial “opinion” rather than factually inaccurate.220
Twitter’s deepfake policy is more nuanced. In February 2020,
the platform announced that it may label any media that had been
“significantly and deceptively altered or fabricated,” and may remove such media if it had been shared in a deceptive manner, and
was likely to impact public safety or cause serious harm.221 Twitter
did not limit the application of its policy to deepfakes that had been
created using artificial intelligence or machine learning, thereby facilitating the removal of cheap fakes. It also listed several factors
that it would consider in its evaluation of the likelihood that the content would cause harm: threats to physical safety of a person or
group; risk of mass violence or widespread civil unrest; and threats
to privacy or free expression or participation in civic events.222 The
limited application of the policy to content likely to cause harm protects artistic and other beneficial deepfakes. Like Twitter,
YouTube’s approach to manipulated media is also conditioned on
the risk of harm. Rather than imposing a blanket ban on deepfakes,
the platform prohibits content “that has been technically manipulated or doctored in a way that misleads users (beyond clips taken
out of context) and may pose a serious risk of egregious harm.”223

219

See, e.g., Nick Bilton, How Facebook Became the Social Media Home of the Right,
VANITY FAIR (June 5, 2020), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2020/06/how-facebookbecame-the-social-media-home-of-the-right [https://perma.cc/AW5F-HDBA].
220
Veronica Penney, How Facebook Handles Climate Disinformation, N.Y. TIMES (July
14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/14/climate/climate-facebook-fact-check
ing.html [https://perma.cc/L2K3-YWW6]; see also Craig Silverman et al., ‘I Have Blood
on My Hands’: A Whistleblower Says Facebook Ignored Global Political Manipulation,
BUZZFEED NEWS (Sept. 14, 2020, 3:36 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/
craigsilverman/facebook-ignore-political-manipulation-whistleblower-memo [https://per
ma.cc/8E3E-FGFF].
221
Yoel Roth & Ashita Achuthan, Building Rules in Public: Our Approach to Synthetic
& Manipulated Media, TWITTER BLOG (Feb. 4, 2020), https://blog.twitter.com/
en_us/topics/company/2020/new-approach-to-synthetic-and-manipulated-media.html
[https://perma.cc/V7A6-44PK].
222
Id.
223
Spam,
Deceptive
Practices
&
Scams
Policies,
YOUTUBE HELP,
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2801973?hl=en&ref_topic=9282365
[htpps://perma.cc/8TGH-5ADW].
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Artistic deepfakes that acknowledge their inauthenticity will not be
affected by this policy.
The private sector has also developed a variety of technological
means to detect deepfakes, for example, by searching for spatial artifacts (e.g., blending boundary, fore/background contrast, inconsistent head poses), and temporal artifacts (e.g. emotional discrepancies, irregular blinking patterns or pulse signal, viseme/phoneme
asynchrony, flickers and jitter).224 Microsoft’s Video Authenticator,
launched in September 2020, is designed to help news outlets and
political campaigns identify, using a confidence score, the likelihood that media has been artificially manipulated, by detecting the
blending boundary of a deepfake and subtle fading or greyscale elements.225 Artifact-based detection can be evaded, however, by mitigating individual flaws within a deepfake, just as deep learning detection methods can be overcome by adversarial machine learning.226 For this reason, deepfake detection technologies should be
supplemented by anti-tampering protection measures, and content
provenance and authenticity frameworks.227 Blockchain and other
distributed ledger technologies may be able to guarantee the provenance, authenticity, and traceability of digital content using smart
contracts.228 Microsoft has developed authentication tools that enable content producers to add digital hashes and certificates to content
metadata, which can be read and verified by browser extensions.229
Congress has also proposed legislation that would increase funding
for efforts by the Department of Defense to counter manipulated
media content,230 award prizes for the development of deepfake
224

See Mirsky & Lee, supra note 17, at 26–27.
Tom Burt, New Steps to Combat Disinformation, MICROSOFT BLOG (Sept. 1, 2020),
https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/09/01/disinformation-deepfakesnewsguard-video-authenticator/ [https://perma.cc/6CAZ-4697].
226
See Mirsky & Lee, supra note 17, at 26, 28.
227
Id. at 28.
228
Paula Fraga-Lamas & Tiago M. Fernández-Caramés, Fake News, Disinformation, and
Deepfakes: Leveraging Distributed Ledger Technologies and Blockchain to Combat
Digital Deception and Counterfeit Reality, Computers and Society, 22 IT PROF’L 53, 55
(2019); Haya. R. Hasan & Khaled Salah, Combating Deepfake Videos Using Blockchain
and Smart Contracts, 7 IEEE ACCESS 41596, 41597 (2019).
229
Burt, supra note 225.
230
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, H.R. 2500, 116th Cong.
§ 256 (2019).
225
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detection technology,231 and require the National Science Foundation (“NSF”) to support research on digital forensic tools designed
to detect deepfakes.232
CONCLUSION

It has not been my intention to downplay the severity of the
harms caused by deepfakes, nor to undermine the legitimacy of public and private sector responses to the unique challenges they pose.
Rather, my goal is to temper alarmist claims of “epistemological anarchy”233 by reminding readers, firstly, that visual evidence has been
vulnerable to manipulation for as long as visual technology has existed, and secondly, that our insistence that seeing should be believing has harmful as well as beneficial consequences. The advent of
deepfakes has exposed the vulnerabilities of an ocularcentric society
and reinforced the importance of building trust in public institutions,
authenticating and corroborating sources, and investing in media literacy and education. The social issues that are exacerbated by deepfakes—including misogyny and misinformation—have deep roots,
and short-term efforts to stifle the distribution of deepfakes should
not distract us from the larger project of dismantling the (invisible)
social structures that support them. Nor should widespread condemnation of pornographic and other harmful deepfakes prompt the misuse of copyright law to remove deepfakes from digital platforms.
Deepfake technology bears significant capacity for social good, and
this capacity should not be stifled by unfounded fearmongering.
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